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REMATCH IN THE RING: GIVING DEATH
ROW INMATES ANOTHER CHANCE TO
CHALLENGE THEIR SENTENCES IN
S UMMERLIN V. STE WART*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the spring 2004 term, the United States Supreme Court
will review the recent Ninth Circuit holding in Summerlin v. Stew-
art.1 In Summerlin, the Ninth Circuit became the first federal ap-
peals court to conclude that the Supreme Court's holding in Ring v.
Arizona2 applies retroactively. 3 The Ring Court held that under the
Sixth Amendment, in states requiring an aggravating factor as a pre-
condition to a death sentence, a jury must find that factor proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt.4 The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether a defendant whose conviction and death sentence became
final before Ring was decided could take advantage of this new con-
stitutional rule on collateral review (i.e., habeas corpus5). The Ninth
Circuit answered in the affirmative, holding that death row inmates
who have exhausted their direct appeals can challenge their sen-
tences retroactively.6
Not surprisingly, Summerlin elicited mixed reactions. Death
penalty opponents heralded the decision and predicted that, if upheld
* Recipient of the 2003-04 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Best Stu-
dent Article Award.
1. 341 F,3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Schriro
v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
2. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
3. SeeSummerlin,341 F.3d. at 1121.
4. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, Summary of 9th Circuit De-
cision in Summerlin v. Stewart, at http://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm
?ID=13447&c=17 (Sept. 4, 2003).
5. Habeas corpus is designed to give a person whose liberty is restrained
an immediate hearing to inquire into and determine the legality of his convic-
tion and sentence. See 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 6 (2003).
6. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d. at 1121.
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by the Supreme Court, "it will slow down the machinery of death in
America's prisons and hasten the day when the death penalty is out-
right abolished."7 Others asserted, in part because other circuits have
held that Ring does not apply retroactively, 8 that Summerlin is "a
clearly erroneous decision which is destined to be reversed."9
Ring is best understood in the context of an earlier landmark Su-
preme Court ruling: Apprendi v. New Jersey.'0 In Apprendi, the
Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reason-
able doubt."" Therefore, allowing a judge to make such factual de-
terminations, rather than a jury of the defendant's peers, violated the
accused's Sixth Amendment rights.' 2
With its decision in Ring two years later, "the Supreme Court ef-
fectively extended its holding in Apprendi to capital cases, conclud-
ing that '[c]apital defendants, no less than non-capital defendants...
are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legisla-
ture conditions an increase in their maximum punishment."" 3  In
Ring, the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of his death sen-
tence, which the sentencing judge increased from life imprisonment
to death upon his finding of aggravating factors. 14 The Arizona Su-
preme Court held petitioner's death sentence consistent with the
7. Elaine Cassel, Dead Wrong or Right On? Should the Supreme Court
Uphold the Ninth Circuit's Reversal of 122 Death Sentences Imposed by
Judges, Not Juries?, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/cassel/20030911.html
(Sept. 11, 2003).
8. See Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1280 (1 1th Cir. 2003); Moore v.
Kinney, 320 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d
989 (10th Cir. 2002).
9. Molly McDonough, Appeals Court Says Ring is Retroactive, A.B.A. J.
EREPORT (Sept. 5, 2003), at http://www.abanet.org/joumal/ereport/s5ring.html.
10. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
11. Id. at 490. See also En Banc Ninth Circuit Rules Ring v. Arizona Ap-
plies Retroactively, 73 CRIM. L. REPORTER 22 (Sept. 10, 2003), at http://
litigationcenter.bna.com/pic2/lit.nsf/id/BNAP-5R8SV2?Open Document [here-
inafter CRIMINAL LAW REPORTER] (discussing the Ring Court's reliance on
Apprendi).
12. See, e.g., Heather Jones, Apprendi v. New Jersey: A True "Watershed"
Ruling, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1361, 1363-64 (2003).
13. Turner, 339 F.3d at 1280 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002)) (citation omitted).
14. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 595-96.
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Sixth Amendment, but the United States Supreme Court reversed.' 5
The Ring Court declared Arizona's capital sentencing statute
unconstitutional because "it allow[ed] a sentencing judge, sitting
without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for im-
position of the death penalty."'16 Writing for the majority, Justice
Ginsberg observed, "[t]he right to trial by jury guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encom-
passed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence
by two years [as in Apprendi], but not the factfmding necessary to
put him to death."' 7 Whereas the petitioner in Ring raised his death
sentence challenge on direct appeal, the Supreme Court left unan-
swered the question whether similarly imposed death sentences could
be challenged by "petitioners, such as Summerlin, who raised the
constitutional challenge in collateral post-conviction proceedings
rather than on direct appeal."'
8
This Comment addresses the retroactive application of the Ring
holding, and explores some of its constitutional implications. Part II
of this Comment summarizes the facts of Summerlin and the proce-
dural background leading up to the Ninth Circuit's decision. Part III
examines the test for determining whether a new constitutional rule
of criminal law may be applied retroactively to cases on collateral
review, as set forth in Teague v. Lane.19 Part IV presents the Ninth
Circuit's analysis of Ring under the Supreme Court's current retroac-
tivity jurisprudence. Part V argues that neither statutory nor legal
precedent renders Summerlin erroneous because the purposes of the
Teague doctrine of retroactivity and public policy support the hold-
ing in Summerlin. Part VI addresses the implications of the Ninth
Circuit's unprecedented decision to apply Ring retroactively. Fi-
nally, this Comment concludes that the Ninth Circuit correctly inter-
preted Ring as a new rule of criminal law that must be applied retro-
actively to cases on collateral review.
15. See id. at 596-97.
16. Id. at 609.
17. Id.
18. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1096 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc),
cert. granted sub nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
19. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Ninth Circuit appropriately characterized the facts of Sum-
merlin as "the raw material from which legal fiction is forged., 20 On
April 29, 1981, a collections agent, Brenna Bailey, went to Warren
Summerlin's home to inquire about an overdue account.2' After
learning that Bailey had not returned to work as expected, Bailey's
boyfriend reported her disappearance to the police.22 That same eve-
ning, the police received an anonymous tip from a female (later iden-
tified as Summerlin's mother-in-law, who based her information on
her daughter's "extra-sensory perception") who believed Summerlin
had murdered Bailey and "rolled up the victim's body in a carpet. 23
Police discovered Bailey's body the next morning wrapped in a
bloody bed sheet in the trunk of her car, which was parked approxi-
mately one mile from Summerlin's home.24 In addition to consider-
able incriminating evidence obtained during a search of Summerlin's
home, Summerlin's wife identified the bloody bed sheet as belonging
to the Summerlin residence.25  The police then arrested Warren
Summerlin for the murder of Brenna Bailey.
26
The psychic tip leading to Summerlin's arrest was just the be-
ginning of this bizarre legal saga. Later chapters depict "an affair be-
tween Summerlin's public defender and his prosecutor at a crucial
plea-negotiation phase, and a sentencing judge who purportedly ex-
perienced difficulty concentrating because of heavy marijuana
use."27 Summerlin's own problems went beyond his tendency to-
ward criminal behavior. As the Ninth Circuit noted, Summerlin "has
organic brain dysfunction, [and] was described by a psychiatrist as
'functionally retarded.'
' 28
After examination by two court-appointed psychiatrists, the
judge found Summerlin competent to stand trial.2 9 The trial lasted
only four days, and the jury took just over three hours to find Sum-
20. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1084.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 1084-85.
24. See id. at 1085.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. McDonough, supra note 9.
28. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1084.
29. See id. at 1085.
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merlin guilty of first-degree murder and sexual assault.3 ° One month
later, the judge held an extremely truncated hearing to hear testimony
and argument on aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 3 1 The
State's entire aggravation case took up only one page of the tran-
32 deese nscript. The defense called no witnesses for its mitigation case.33
Several days after the adjournment of the penalty phase, the judge
sentenced Sunmerlin to death upon finding two aggravating circum-
stances and no mitigating circumstances.34
On January 17, 1984, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed
Summerlin's conviction and death sentence.35 Several unsuccessful
petitions for habeas corpus in both state and federal court followed.36
Then, in 1998, the district court denied Summerlin's motion to va-
cate the judgment, but "issued a certificate of probable cause ena-
bling Summerlin to appeal." 37 A three-judge panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit remanded the case "for an evidentiary hearing as to whether [the
judge] was competent when he was deliberating on whether to im-
pose the death penalty."
38
In the meantime, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Ring.39 Summerlin moved to stay the proceedings in order to "re-
quest that the Arizona Supreme Court recall the mandate in his direct
appeal to consider Ring's application to his case. ' The Ninth Cir-
cuit granted the stay, but the Arizona Supreme Court denied Sum-
merlin's motion to recall the mandate.4' Subsequently, the Ninth
Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc42 to determine several issues,
including whether Ring applies retroactively.43
30. See id. at 1088.
31. Id. at 1088.
32. Id. at 1089.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 1090. The two aggravating circumstances were "(1) that the
defendant had a prior felony conviction involving the use of threatened use of
violence on another person.., and (2) that Summerlin [murdered Bailey] in an
especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner." Id.
35. Id. at 1091.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. Sunmmerlin v. Stewart, 310 F.3d 1221.(9th Cir. 2002).
43. See Summerlin, 341 Fd. at 1092.
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III. THE TEAGUE DOCTRINE FOR RETROACTIVITY
A. Historical Background of the Teague Doctrine
Whether a new rule of constitutional law applies retroactively to
cases on collateral review is a relatively new question for the
courts. 44 English common law made all new rules retroactive on
both direct and collateral review.4 Similarly, throughout most of
American history, new constitutional rules were presumptively retro-
active: "[B]oth the common law and our own decisions recognized a
general rule of retrospective effect for the constitutional decisions of
this Court.
' 4 6
In 1867, following the Civil War and enactment of the Four-
teenth Amendment, Congress expanded the scope of habeas corpus
review to state court convictions.47 This expansion "prompt[ed] the
Supreme Court to determine the proper scope of federal habeas juris-
diction."48 In 1953, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Allen 49 "con-
firmed the cognizability of all federal constitutional claims filed by
state prisoners," which led to a significant increase in the number of
federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners.50 At the same time,
the Court became concerned "with the impacts of its fast-moving
pace of constitutional innovation in the criminal field." 51 Thus arose
the "novel discussion" about retroactively applying new constitu-
tional rules of criminal procedure.52
In Linkletter v. Walker,53 the Supreme Court announced a three-
part balancing test for determining whether new constitutional rules
would apply retroactively to convictions challenged on direct appeal
44. See id. at 1097.
45. See Ronn Gehring, Note, Tyler v. Cain: A Fork in the Path for Habeas
Corpus or the End of the Road for Collateral Review?, 36 AKRON L. REV. 18 1,
181-82 (2002).
46. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507 (1973).
47. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1097.
48. Id.
49. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
50. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1097.
51. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
52. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1097.
53. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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and collaterally by writ of habeas corpus. 4 The Linkletter Court
held that "a constitutional rule of criminal procedure would not be
retroactive unless, under a case-by-case analysis, three factors-the
purpose of the new rule, reliance on prior doctrine, and the effect of
retroactivity on the administration of justice-favor retroactive ap-
plication of the rule."55
Six years after Linkletter, in Mackey v. United States,56 Justice
Harlan wrote separately to advocate a new approach to retroactiv-
ity.57 Harlan was dissatisfied with the Linkletter test (which would
remain the controlling doctrine of retroactivity for twenty-four years)
because it allowed for unacceptably inconsistent results.5 8 For ex-
ample, Linkletter was "used to limit application of certain new rules
to cases on direct review, other new rules only to the defendants in
the cases announcing such rules, and still other new rules to cases in
which trials [had] not yet commenced., 59 In time, the Court ac-
knowledged that the Linkletter test led to disparate treatment of simi-
larly situated defendants on both direct and collateral review.60 Un-
abashedly recognizing that "commentators have 'had a veritable field
day' with the Linkletter standard," the Supreme Court adopted Jus-
tice Harlan's approach to retroactivity in Teague.
61
B. The Presumption Against Retroactivity of New Procedural Rules
In Teague v. Lane, the Supreme Court held that "[u]nless they
fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules
of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which
have become final before the new rules are announced., 62 It is im-
portant to note that the Teague retroactivity doctrine only applies to
new rules of criminal procedure63 because, "unlike strictly proce-
54. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1098.
55. Id. (citing Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636).
56. 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
57. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 303-04 (1989).
58. See id. at 302.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 304-05.
61. Id. at 303 (quoting Francis S. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity:
A Critique anda Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (1975)).
62. Id. at 310.
63. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (holding that
"Teague by its terms applies only to procedural rules").
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dural rules, 'new rules of substantive criminal- law are presumptively
retroactive.' 64 Accordingly, "[tihe threshold question in a Teague
analysis is whether the rule the petitioner seeks to apply is a substan-
tive rule or a procedural rule ...."65
If the new rule is procedural, the court must undertake a three-
step analysis to determine whether it applies retroactively on collat-
eral review.66 First, the court must establish when the defendant's
conviction became final.67 Second, the court must survey "the legal
landscape as it then [at the time of conviction] existed ' 68 because,
"[i]f existing precedent already required application of the rule, the
Teague bar does not apply."49 Accordingly, a rule is not "new" for
Teague purposes and applies retroactively if application of the rule
was mandated by then-existing precedent.
70
On the other hand, if a court determines that a constitutional rule
of criminal procedure is in fact new, the court must proceed with the
third step, which is to determine whether the rule falls within one of
two narrow exceptions to the general rule of nonretroactivity. 71 Even
if a procedural rule is new, it will not apply retroactively to appeals
from final convictions unless one of two exceptions applies.72
C. Teague's Two Exceptions for Overcoming the Presumption
Against Retroactivity
After adopting Justice Harlan's general rule against retroactivity,
the Teague plurality likewise adopted Harlan's exceptions as set
forth twenty-four years earlier in Mackey.73 Under the first excep-
tion, a new rule will be applied retroactively "if it places 'certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe."' 74 In other words, this
64. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1099 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(quoting Santana-Madera v. United States, 260 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001)),
cert. granted sub nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461,468 (1993).
69. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1099.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 12, at 1369.
73. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 303-10 (1989).
74. Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)
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exception only applies when "certain primary conduct has been de-
criminalized" or when "certain classes of individuals are immunized
from specified forms of punishment by the newly announced rule.,
75
Although the Teague plurality adopted Harlan's first exception
in its entirety, it adopted Harlan's second excetion to the general
rule against retroactivity "with a modification.",7 In Mackey, Harlan
argued that a new rule should apply retroactively if it requires the ob-
servance of "those procedures that... are 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty. ""7 7 The Teague plurality stated that "[t]he language
used by Justice Harlan... leaves no doubt that he meant the second
exception to be reserved for watershed rules of criminal proce-
dure., 78 Accordingly, the plurality limited the second Teague excep-
tion "to those new procedures without which the likelihood of an ac-
curate conviction is seriously diminished.,
79
Following Teague, district courts were unclear as to the scope of
the second exception, especially in the death penalty context, where
there was conflict over whether this exception "include[d] new rules
of capital sentencing that only 'preserve the accuracy and fairness of
capital sentencing judgments.' 8 In Sawyer v. Smith,81 the Supreme
Court addressed the conflict and formulated the controlling definition
of Teague's second exception:
It is thus not enough under Teague to say that a new rule is
aimed at improving the accuracy of trial. More is required.
A rule that qualifies under this exception must not only im-
prove accuracy, but also "'alter our understanding of the
bedrock procedural elements' essential to the fairness of a
proceeding.
82
Therefore, a new procedural rule only applies retroactively if it falls
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
75. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1109.
76. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
77. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
78. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
79. Id. at 313.
80. Karl N. Metzner, Note, Retroactivity, Habeas Corpus, and the Death
Penalty: An Unholy Alliance, 41 DUKE L.J. 160, 178 (1991) (quoting Brief for
Petitioner at 30, Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990)).
81. 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
82. Id. at 242 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693) (emphasis in original).
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within one of Teague's two narrow exceptions.
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT's TEAGUE ANALYSIS OF RING V. ARIZONA
The significance of Summerlin is not only that the Ninth Circuit
concluded Ring applies retroactively, but also that the court found
two separate grounds upon which to base its conclusion. 83 First, the
court decided that Ring was a new rule of substantive criminal law,
so that it applies retroactively without any consideration of the
Teague doctrine.84 In addition, to the extent that Ring is procedural,
the court interpreted it as a "watershed rule" that "satisfies the crite-
ria of Teague and must be given retroactive effect on habeas re-
view."
85
A. Ring Announced a New Substantive Rule
The Ninth Circuit began by addressing "the threshold Teague
question, namely whether Ring announced a substantive rule or a
procedural rule." 86 This initial inquiry is critical to the determination
of retroactivity because "[u]nlike strictly procedural rules, 'new rules
of substantive criminal law are presumptively retroactive."' 87 The
court explained the difference between substantive and procedural
rules as follows: "[F]or Teague purposes, a new rule is one of pro-
cedure if it impacts the operation of the criminal trial process, and a
new rule is one of 'substance' if it alters the scope or modifies the
applicability of a substantive criminal statute."
88
Determining whether a new rule is substantive or procedural is
not always a simple task. Quoting Chief Judge Becker of the Third
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit observed that "[i]n the habeas context in
particular... there are those cases that do 'not fall neatly under ei-
ther the substantive or procedural doctrinal category' .... In such
cases, 'the best approach is to recognize that [the new rule] is neither
entirely substantive nor procedural.' ' 8 9 According to the Ninth Cir-
83. See, e.g., CRIM. L. REPORTER, supra note 11.
84. See Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc), cert. granted sub nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
85. Id. at 1121.
86. Id. at 1099.
87. Id. (quoting Santana-Madera v. United States, 260 F.3d 133, 138 (2d
Cir. 2001)).
88. Id. at 1100.
89. Id. at 1101 (quoting United States v. Woods, 986 F.2d 669, 677 (3d Cir.
1993)).
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cuit, Ring is such a rule.90 The court conceded that by requiring a
jury, rather than a judge, to find aggravating circumstances necessary
to impose the death penalty, Ring addressed "the procedure by which
any capital trial must be conducted." 91 Nevertheless, the court em-
phasized that Ring is not strictly a procedural rule:
More than a procedural holding, Ring effected a redefini-
tion of Arizona capital murder law, restoring, as a matter of
substantive law, an earlier Arizona legal paradigm in which
murder and capital murder are separate substantive offenses
with different essential elements and different forms of po-
tential punishment. That is, as applied to the particular Ari-
zona murder statute at issue here, Ring's holding was "sub-
stantive" for Teague purposes.
92
Unlike most new procedural rules, new rules of substantive criminal
law apply retroactively.93 Therefore, in holding that Ring is a new
substantive rule, the court gave Summerlin and others in Ninth Cir-
cuit states with judge-imposed death sentences the right to challenge
their sentences on collateral review.94
B. Alternatively, Ring Announced a New Procedural Rule that
Overcomes Teague's Presumption Against Retroactivity
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Ring announced a new rule
of substantive criminal law immediately entitled Sunmerlin to retro-
active application of that rule. Accordingly, it was unnecessary to go
through a full Teague analysis because "[a]ny new substantive inter-
pretation will automatically be applied retroactively without having
to meet any other requirements." 95 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit
seized the opportunity to present an alternative basis for applying
Ring retroactively.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1102.
93. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998).
94. When Summerlin was decided, more than 122 prisoners on death row in
Arizona, Montana, Nevada, and Idaho had been sentenced to death by a judge.
See Elaine Cassel, Bad News for Prosecutors: 122 Condemned Prisoners May
Not Be Executed, at http://babelogue.citypages.com:8080/ecassel/2003/09/03
(Sept. 3, 2003). For more on the implications of Summerlin, see infra Part VI.
95. Jones, supra note 12, at 1370 (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.
614, 620-21 (1998)).
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1. Ring is a "new rule" as defined by Teague
The court began its Teague procedural analysis by considering
whether the rule announced in Ring was in fact "new." 96 A proce-
dural rule is not new for Teague purposes if, at the time a defendant's
conviction became final, "the result.., was dictated by then existing
precedent."
97
Consistent with the Teague three-step analysis, the court first de-
termined that Summerlin's conviction became final in 1984.98 Next,
the court "'survey[ed] the legal landscape' as it existed in 1984 to de-
termine whether the result in Ring was dictated by then existing
precedent." 99 The court pointed out that Summerlin's conviction be-
came final before the Supreme Court decided Ring, which overruled
a prior Supreme Court decision, Walton v. Arizona. 00 Because
"there can be no dispute that a decision announces a new rule if it
expressly overrules a prior decision,"'' ° the Ninth Circuit had "no
doubt that Ring announced a new rule as that term is construed for
Teague purposes."'
10 2
2. Ring falls within the second Teague exception
After concluding that the rule announced in Ring was new, the
court proceeded to the third step in the Teague analysis, "namely
96. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1099.
97. Id. at 1108. For a more comprehensive discussion of the Teague doc-
trine, see supra Part III.
98. That year, Summerlin failed to file a writ of certiorari with the Supreme
Court following the Arizona Supreme Court's refusal to rehear its opinion af-
firming his conviction and death sentence. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1108.
99. Id.(quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461,468 (1993)).
100. 497 U.S. 639 (1990). Like Summerlin, Walton challenged the constitu-
tionality of Arizona's death penalty statute. The Supreme Court rejected
Walton's challenge and held that "the Sixth Amendment did not require a jury
determination regarding whether or not to impose the death penalty." Thomas
Aumann, Death by Peers: The Extension of the Sixth Amendment to Capital
Sentencing in Ring v. Arizona, 34 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 845, 868 (2003). Ten
years after Walton, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi, which held that any
aggravating factor, other than a prior conviction, necessary to increase a defen-
dant's punishment beyond the statutory maximum must be found by a jury.
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Recognizing "that
Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable," the Supreme Court overruled Walton
in Ring. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
101. Graham, 506 U.S. at 467.
102. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1109.
1258
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whether either of Teague's two exceptions apply."' 10 3 The first ex-
ception applies only if a new rule decriminalizes certain primary
conduct or immunizes certain classes of people from specific types
of punishment. 1°4 The second exception applies only if a new rule
"(1) seriously enhance[s] the accuracy of the proceeding and (2) al-
ter[s] our understanding of bedrock procedural elements essential to
the fairness of the proceeding."'
0 5
It took but a single paragraph for the court to dismiss any notion
that Teague's first exception applies to Ring.10 6 As the court noted,
"[b]ecause Ring did not 'decriminalize a class of conduct nor pro-
hibit the imposition of capital punishment on a particular class of
persons,' the first exception is inapplicable."' 0 7 In stark contrast, the
court invested considerable time and ink explaining how Ring meets
both requirements of Teague's second exception. First, the court de-
cided that the new rule announced in Ring would seriously enhance
the accuracy of capital murder trials in Arizona.'0 8 Second, the court
concluded that Ring was a watershed rule that "altered the fundamen-
tal bedrock principles applicable to capital murder trials."'10 9
a. Ring enhances the accuracy of capital trials
The Ninth Circuit found "several reasons why fact-finding by a
jury, rather than by a judge, is more likely to heighten the accuracy
of capital sentencing proceedings."'"10 For example, in capital pro-
ceedings prior to Ring, a "sentencing judge receive[d] an inordinate
amount of inadmissible evidence,"" including pre-sentence reports,
victim impact statements, and letters from victims' families. 12 The
sentencing judge in Summerlin received exactly this kind of inadmis-
sible evidence "[b]efore hearing any presentation by the parties."
' 1 3
Although courts presume that sentencing judges can distinguish ad-
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. Id. (citing Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)).
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).
108. See id. at 1116.
109. Id. at 1121.
110. Id. at 1110.111. Id. at 1111.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1112.
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missible evidence from inadmissible evidence, the court pointed out
that such judicial prudence was not the issue.1 14 "The relevant ques-
tion is not whether judges have been able to do so, but whether sub-
jecting penalty-phase evidence to the crucible of a formal trial by
jury would reduce the risk of error. There is little doubt that it
would."' 1 5 Therefore, the court concluded that by requiring a jury,
rather than a judge, to find the aggravating factors necessary to im-
pose the death penalty, Ring enhances the accuracy of capital convic-
tions and "diminish[es] the risk of... erroneous verdict[s].""16
In addition to the inherent evidentiary concerns discussed above,
the court suggested two other reasons why jury fact-finding in capital
sentencing would improve the accuracy of convictions. 17 The first
relates to one of the jury's "critical functions" to express and act in
accordance with contemporary community values." The court ob-
served that, while most jurors would not sit on a capital case more
than once, Arizona judges routinely preside over capital cases." 9
The risk, then, is that judges may become habituated to "imposing
capital punishment under near rote conditions."'' 20 According to the
Ninth Circuit, Summerlin clearly illustrates this point-the judge
who sentenced Summerlin to death "imposed capital punishment on
[another convict] in a separate case on the same day."' 121 The court
concluded that the rule announced in Ring, which entrusts the jury
with authority to impose a death sentence, established "an important
procedural safeguard, because the jury members 'are more attuned
[than judges] to the community's moral sensibility,' 'reflect more ac-
curately the composition and experiences of the community as a
whole,' and act to 'express the conscience of the community on the
ultimate question of life or death."1
22
Another reason for the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that juror fact-
finding would improve the accuracy of capital convictions is that,
114. See id. at 1113.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Seeid. at 1113-15.
118. Id. at 1113.
119. Seeid. at 1114.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1113-14 (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615-16 (2002)
(Breyer, J., concurring)).
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unlike judges, jurors do not stand for election in Arizona. 123 Citing
empirical evidence and legal commentary, the court asserted,
"Judges who face election are far more likely to impose the death
penalty than either juries or appointed judges.' 24  Therefore, the
court reasoned that jurors are less likely than judges to be influenced
by external considerations when deciding whether to sentence some-
one to death.
125
b. Ring alters our understanding of bedrock procedural elements
essential to the fairness of capital murder trials
To fall within Teague's second watershed rule exception, a new
rule must do more than enhance the accuracy of the proceeding. The
new rule must also "alter[] our understanding of bedrock procedural
elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding."' 126 According to
the Ninth Circuit, Ring met this requirement because it "fundamen-
tally altered the procedural structure of capital sentencing applicable
to all states."'
' 27
In deciding whether Ring satisfies Teague 's second exception, a
critical consideration is whether Ring error is structural or harm-
less. 128 The Ninth Circuit concluded that structural error occurs
where a judge-a "constitutionally-disqualified factfinder"--decides
whether to impose the death penalty.129 Moreover, "[i]f structural er-
ror is present, 'a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a
vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal pun-
ishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair."",130  Relying on
three Supreme Court decisions, 13 1 the court stated, "where an im-
123. See id. at 1115.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1116 (citing Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)).
127. Id.
128. See id. at 1119.
129. See id. at 1116. The Supreme Court has defined a structural error as a
"defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than
simply an error in the trial process itself." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 310 (1991).
130. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1116 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570,
577-78 (1986)).
131. Nguyen v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2130 (2003) (vacating all judg-
ments rendered by federal appellate panel on which an "unauthorized" non-
Article Il judge served); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (holding
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properly constituted or situated tribunal reaches a decision, that deci-
sion is infected with a 'plain defect' and must be vacated.' 32 Fi-
nally, the Ninth Circuit held that because Ring seriously enhances the
accuracy of death penalty cases and alters our understanding of bed-
rock procedural elements essential to the fairness of capital trials,
Ring is a watershed rule of criminal procedure that applies retroac-
tively on collateral review.
133
V. ANALYSIS
In Summerlin, the Ninth Circuit correctly held that Ring is a new
constitutional rule of criminal law that applies retroactively on col-
lateral review. Despite being the first circuit to so hold, neither statu-
tory nor case precedent dictates a contrary holding. Furthermore, the
purposes of the Teague doctrine of retroactivity and public policy
support the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Ring challenges must be
available to death row inmates like Summerlin, whose convictions
became final before Ring was decided.
A. The AEDPA Does Not Preclude Summerlinfrom Applying Ring
Retroactively
In the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act'
34
("AEDPA") of 1996, Congress codified the Teague doctrine of retro-
activity.135 The AEDPA provides in pertinent part:
A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus
application under section 2254 that was not presented in a
prior application shall be dismissed unless-
... the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule
of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavail-
that deficient reasonable doubt jury instruction is structural error); N. Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (holding entire
administrative scheme unconstitutional where bankruptcy judges were dele-
gated powers beyond those conferred to non-Article III judges).
132. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1118 (quoting Nguyen, 123 S. Ct. at 2137-38.
133. See id. at 1121.
134. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
135. See Gehring, supra note 45, at 208-09.
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able.. .136
On its face, the AEDPA imposes a more restrictive standard than
Teague for applying new rules retroactively. In particular, Congress
declined to include Teague's two exceptions for overcoming the pre-
sumption against nonretroactivity. 137 Following the AEDPA's en-
actment, two issues were unclear: (1) what Congress meant by the
words "made retroactive," and (2) whether Teague's two exceptions
were still good law.'
38
In Tyler v. Cain, 39 the Supreme Court stepped in to address the
first issue. The Court held in Tyler that "a new rule is not 'made ret-
roactive to cases on collateral review' unless the Supreme Court
holds it to be retroactive."' 140 Therefore, in cases governed by the
AEDPA, post-conviction challenges based on new constitutional
rules are permitted only when the Supreme Court has held that the
new rules apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. 14'
As to the second issue, some scholars have argued that the Su-
preme Court's holding in Tyler "effectively eliminate[d] the two ex-
ceptions in Teague v. Lane, which in turn ma[de] the doctrine in
Teague obsolete."'142 To the contrary, the Teague doctrine is not ob-
solete-Teague continues to determine a new rule's retroactivity in
cases like Summerlin, where the habeas corpus petition was filed be-
fore the AEDPA became effective.
143
When the Ninth Circuit issued its ruling in Summerlin, all but
one of the circuits to consider Ring's retroactivity analyzed the rule
under the AEDPA standard. 144 The Ninth Circuit, however, appro-
136. AEDPA § 106(b), 28 U.S.C.S. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2002).
137. See Gehring, supra note 45, at 209.
138. See id.
139. 533 U.S. 656 (2001).
140. Id. at 663.
141. See id. at 662.
142. Gehring, supra note 45, at 210.
143. Moreover, a Teague analysis may be required even in cases governed
by the AEDPA. "[I]n addition to performing any analysis required by
AEDPA, a federal court considering a habeas petition must conduct a threshold
Teague analysis when the issue is properly raised by the state." Horn v. Banks,
536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002).
144. See Moore v. Kinney, 320 F.3d 767, 771 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(Ring not retroactive under AEDPA because the Supreme Court did not ex-
pressly hold Ring retroactive); Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 994 (10th Cir.
2002) (noting that Ring is not retroactive under AEDPA). At the time Sum-
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priately analyzed Ring under the Teague doctrine, not the AEDPA.
As the court explained, "[b]ecause [Summerlin's] petition for habeas
corpus was filed before AEDPA's effective date, pre-AEDPA law
governs the petition.' ' 145 As a result, the Ninth Circuit was free to
consider Ring in light of the Teague exceptions and decide that the
second watershed rule exception provides a basis for applying Ring
retroactively.
B. Apprendi Does Not Preclude Ring From Applying Retroactively
As discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court's landmark holding in
Apprendi declared that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.' 146 Ring is widely recognized as an extension of
Apprendi to death penalty cases. 147  Consequently, a frequently
raised argument for not applying Ring retroactively is that courts
have held Apprendi nonretroactive. Numerous courts addressing the
issue, including the Ninth Circuit, 148 have concluded that Apprendi is
not a substantive rule, but rather a procedural rule that fails to meet
the stringent requirements of Teague's second exception.149 There-
fore, some courts have held that, by logical necessity, "Ring, like
Apprendi, does not apply retroactively on collateral review."'
150
Concluding that Ring cannot be retroactive simply because Ap-
prendi is not retroactive is unconvincing because it fails to recognize
significant distinctions between Apprendi and Ring. For example,
"the Supreme Court made clear in Apprendi that it was announcing a
merlin was decided, only the Eleventh Circuit had addressed whether Ring is
retroactive under the Teague doctrine. See Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247,
1282-86 (11 th Cir. 2003) (holding that Ring is a new procedural rule that does
not fall within Teague's second exception).
145. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc),
cert. granted sub nom. Schriro v. Sumnmerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
146. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see also CRIMINAL
LAW REPORTER, supra note 11 (discussing the Ring Court's reliance on Ap-
prendi).
147. See, e.g., Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 994 (10th Cir. 2002);
Aumann, supra note 100, at 875.
148. See United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 670 (9th Cir.
2002).
149. See Turner, 339 F.3d at 1284.
150. Id. at 1286.
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procedural rule only."'' The Supreme Court made no such pro-
nouncement in Ring, which necessarily means the Court did not
foreclose the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Ring as a new substan-
tive rule with retroactive effect. More significantly, Apprendi ap-
plies only to non-capital criminal cases. Ring, on the other hand, ap-
plies specifically to capital cases, where the Eighth Amendment
demands heightened standards of fairness. 5 2 Death penalty cases are
fundamentally different than other criminal cases, so even if Ap-
prendi is not retroactive, that fact does not necessarily mean Ring is
not retroactive. Summerlin raised an issue of first impression in the
Ninth Circuit, and absent an express pronouncement from the Su-
preme Court that Ring is not retroactive, case precedent does not de-
cide Summerlin one way or the other.
C. Summerlin Is Consistent with the Purposes of the Great Writ
The current Supreme Court Justices hold differing views on the
fundamental purpose of the writ of habeas corpus (the "Great Writ")
and the retroactivity doctrine. 153 As one commentator noted, "[t]his
debate lies at the heart of Teague."' 54 Despite the fundamental dif-
ference between the minority and majority views of the Great Writ's
purpose, both illustrate that the Ninth Circuit decided Summerlin cor-
rectly.
The minority believes that "the function of habeas corpus is to
ensure that the conviction or sentence complies with the dictates of
the Constitution, regardless of the good faith of the state courts."' 5
This interpretation allows a convicted prisoner to benefit from a fa-
vorable change in constitutional law even though he was properly
convicted under the former law.156 Under the minority view, the
Ninth Circuit correctly held that Summerlin was entitled to challenge
his death sentence on collateral review despite the fact that, at the
time of his conviction, Arizona's capital sentencing scheme was con-
151. CRIMINAL LAW REPORTER, supra note 11.
152. See generally Metzner, supra note 80 (suggesting that the Supreme
Court should amend its habeas corpus doctrine to reflect the qualitative differ-
ences between capital and non-capital punishment).
153. See id. at 165-66.
154. Id. at 162.
155. Id. at 166.
156. See id. at 162.
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stitutional as declared by the Supreme Court in Walton.
The Supreme Court majority adheres to Justice Harlan's view
that the primary purpose of habeas review is to "police the states and
prevent unconstitutional practices."1 57 Indeed, Teague's general rule
against applying new procedural rules of criminal law retroactively
appears to support Harlan's interpretation of the Great Writ's pur-
pose. Certainly it is not misconduct for states to act in accordance
with the Supreme Court's understanding of the Constitution. Thus,
according to the majority view, most new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure should not apply in a post-conviction collateral
challenge "because at the time of the conviction, the states were op-
erating within the dictates of the Constitution as it was then inter-
preted."'
' 58
However, even the majority recognizes two significant excep-
tions to the general rule of nonretroactivity, as evidenced by the
Teague doctrine. The first exception applies when a new procedural
rule places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct be-
yond the power of the criminal law-making authority to pro-
scribe.' 59 The second exception applies when a new procedural rule
"seriously enhance[s] the accuracy of the proceeding" and "alter[s]
our understanding of bedrock procedural elements essential to the
fairness of the proceeding."' 60 When either of these two exceptions
arises, the Supreme Court majority advocates retroactive application.
Clearly, then, the majority view allows a new rule of criminal
procedure to have retroactive effect even in situations that have noth-
ing to do with correcting state misconduct. Therefore, the majority
view does not preclude the holding in Summerlin simply because
Arizona convicted and sentenced Summerlin under a death penalty
statute that was constitutional in 1984. On the contrary, even under
the majority view, the Ninth Circuit decided Summerlin properly be-
cause Ring is a new procedural rule that applies retroactively under
Teague's second exception.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
160. Surnmerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(citing Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)), cert. granted sub nom.
Schriro v. Sunmerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
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D. Timing Should Not Make the Difference Between Life and Death
In Summerlin, the Ninth Circuit correctly decided that Ring ap-
plies retroactively. Had it reached a contrary decision, the court
would have given its stamp of approval to a system in which "pris-
oners [would] now be executed by the state solely because of the
happenstance that the Supreme Court recognized the correctness of
their constitutional arguments too late."'
161
Judge Reinhardt's impassioned concurrence reveals the injustice
of denying a convicted criminal the right to collaterally challenge his
unconstitutionally imposed death sentence. Reinhardt asked, "Can
we justify executing those whose legal efforts had reached a certain
point in our imperfect legal process on the day the Supreme Court
changed its mind, while invalidating the death sentences of those
whose cases were waiting slightly further down the line?"'162 Com-
mentator Michael Tigar, writing thirteen years before Summerlin,
provided an answer to this very question: "[A] death sentence
[sh]ould only be carried out if the standards of justice that led to it
were fair as measured at the time of the proposed execution, and not
at the time of the crime or at some point during the review proc-
ess."'
163
As announced by the Supreme Court in Ring, the Sixth Amend-
ment mandates that a jury, not a judge, find the aggravating factors,
other than a prior conviction, necessary to increase a defendant's
sentence from life imprisonment to death. Ring extended the Court's
holding in Apprendi, a decision in which "liberal and conservative
Justices alike agreed ... how very fundamental and basic is the prin-
ciple that juries, not judges, must find sentence-determining facts."'
64
Whether Ring announced a new substantive rule or a "watershed
rule" of criminal procedure, the constitutional rights it guarantees
must be available to all defendants without regard to the timing of
their appeals.
161. Id. at 1124 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 1125 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
163. Michael E. Tigar, Habeas Corpus and the Penalty of Death, 90 COLUM.
L. REv. 255, 272 (1990) (reviewing JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1988)).
164. Cassel, supra note 7.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS OF SUMMERLIN
Summerlin has the potential to greatly affect death penalty juris-
prudence. The immediate consequence of the decision was to grant
death row inmates in Ninth Circuit states the ability to reopen their
cases by challenging their unconstitutionally judge-imposed sen-
tences on collateral review. Summerlin, therefore, "could lead to the
technical commutation of sentences of more than 122 prisoners in
Arizona, Montana, Nevada, and Idaho... the four states within the
jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit that utilize judges, not juries, to sen-
tence defendants in capital cases."'
65
Not surprisingly, one criticism of Summerlin is that allowing
post-conviction Ring challenges will open the floodgates and signifi-
cantly burden our judicial system.' 66 This argument has the support
of Justice O'Connor, who dissented in both Apprendi and Ring. In
her Ring dissent, O'Connor reminded the majority of her earlier pre-
diction that Apprendi would "unleash a flood of petitions by con-
victed defendants seeking to invalidate their sentences in whole or in
part on the authority of [that decision]. 167 Arguably, by extending
Apprendi to the death penalty context in Ring, and then by allowing
Ring challenges on both direct and collateral review in Summerlin,
an even greater number of convicted defendants will seek relief in
the federal courts.
It is difficult to imagine, however, that the federal court system
is so overburdened that it could not handle a few hundred more
cases. As one commentator observed, "If our federal court system
cannot handle these cases, when the challengers' very lives are at
stake, what good is it?'
168
Moreover, a Ring challenge on collateral review does not over-
turn the conviction so as to require a whole new trial. 6 9 Instead,
"[o]nly the sentence would be overturned.., so all the evidence
from the transcript of the previous trial would be available at the re-
sentencing."' 170  The resentencing procedure would be relatively
165. Cassel, supra note 94.
166. See, e.g., Cassel, supra note 7.
167. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 551 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting).
168. Cassel, supra note 7.
169. See, e.g., Metzner, supra note 80, at 189.
170. Id.
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straightforward, with the state presenting to the jury its aggravating
circumstances, and the defendant offering any mitigating factors.
171
It is unthinkable that the federal courts would deny defendants the
right to challenge their unconstitutional death sentences simply be-
cause they are too busy. When the issue is a matter of life or death,
the federal courts must find time to review unconstitutional sen-
tences.
While Summerlin's impact on Ninth Circuit states that allow
judges to impose death sentences is evident, it is premature to specu-
late how the case will affect states with "hybrid sentencing schemes
in which the jury renders an advisory verdict but the judge makes the
ultimate sentencing determination."' 172 Alabama, Delaware, Florida,
and Indiana have such death penalty statutes, and when the Ninth
Circuit decided Summerlin, there were 632 inmates on death row in
these states. 173 At present, the Supreme Court has not decided that
death sentences imposed under hybrid sentencing schemes violate
the Sixth Amendment. However, Summerlin seems to suggest that
they do. Even when a jury finds the aggravating factors necessary to
impose the death penalty, a judge, "a constitutionally-disqualified
factfinder,"' 174 has the ability to override the jury's determination.
When a judge uses his power to sentence a defendant to death over
the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment, the effect is to ren-
der the jury's fact-finding authority moot. Perhaps addressing this
issue will be the next step in the Supreme Court's evolving capital
sentencing jurisprudence.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court limited its grant of certiorari in Summerlin
to two questions:
1 75
(1) Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the new rule
announced in Ring is substantive, rather than procedural,
171. See id.
172. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 621 (2002) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
173. See Charles Lane, Death Row Inmates Get Legal Break, WASH. POST,
Sept. 3, 2003, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn/A 16323-2003Sep2?language=printer.
174. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1116 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc),
cert. granted sub nom. Schriro v. Sumnerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
175. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
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and therefore exempt from the retroactivity analysis of
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion)?
(2) Did the Ninth Circuit err by alternatively holding that
the new rule announced in Ring applies retroactively to
cases on collateral review under Teague's exception for wa-
tershed rules of criminal procedure that alter bedrock prin-
ciples and seriously enhance the accuracy of the proceed-
ings?
176
As this Comment illustrates, the answer to each of these questions
must be "no." In Summerlin, the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded
that Ring announced a new constitutional rule that must be applied
retroactively to habeas corpus petitions. On the one hand, Ring is a
substantive rule, in that it substantively changed the death penalty
statutes in Arizona and other states that formerly allowed judges to
determine facts necessary to increase a defendant's sentence from
life imprisonment to death. As a new substantive rule, Ring is pre-
sumptively retroactive without further consideration of the Teague
doctrine of retroactivity. Additionally, Ring is a watershed rule of
criminal procedure, and as such, applies retroactively under the sec-
ond Teague exception.
Although statutory or legal precedent does not dictate the deci-
sion reached in Summerlin, the purposes of the Teague doctrine
clearly warrant Ring's retroactive application. Furthermore, there are
strong public policy reasons for not condemning someone to death
simply because of the timing of his appeal. The federal courts
should provide a forum for convicted prisoners to challenge their
death sentences whenever it becomes clear that the imposition of
their sentences was unconstitutional. While Summerlin will un-
doubtedly impact states that allow judge-imposed death sentences,
we have yet to see how the decision will affect other states with hy-
brid sentencing schemes.
176. Brief for Petitioner on the Merits, Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833
(2003) (No. 03-526).
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Capital sentencing demands the highest degree of fairness and
patience. Therefore, the Supreme Court should uphold and affirm
the fundamental principles and procedural safeguards recognized in
Summerlin. Sara N. Williams*
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